Karaca, Ç.2024-03-182024-03-182023.01.011303-8303https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=dspace_ku&SrcAuth=WosAPI&KeyUT=WOS:001137400100011&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=WOS_CPLhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12597/19138This paper addresses the problem of reductionism, which is a highly controversial issue in philosophy of biology. It is argued that a physicalist approach toward life does not mean that biology is reducible to physics. In this context, the differences between physicalism and reduction to physics are explained. Methodological, epistemological, and ontological aspects of reductionism are dealt with separately, and first, methodological reductionism, which reduces a whole to its parts, is criticized. Then, the epistemological aspect of reductionism is investigated. The basis of theory reduction is the assumption that evolutionary and historical processes do not involve any logical principles, from which it is concluded it is physics, which primarily explores the laws of nature, that provides ultimate explanations about nature. Against this idea, it is argued that the pluralism of scientific explanations and a non-reductionist integration of these explanations can co-exist.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessReductionismpluralismphysicalismbiologylaws of natureArticle10.29228/beytulhikme.69691001137400100011220244134